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SIX 
CAN LUCE IRIGARAY'S NOTION OF 
SEXUAL DIFFERENCE BE APPLIED 
TO TRANSSEXUAL AND 
TRANSGENDER NARRATIVES? 
Danielle Poe 
For over thirty years, Luce lrigaray's work on sexual difference has been 
the subject of debate about whether sexual difference is essential, necessary, 
oppressive, or some combination of these. I examine critiques from people 
who claim that her work is based on an essentialism that is dismissive 
and harmful to transsexual and transgender discourse. I argue that lrigaray's 
ethics, based on sexual difference, has the potential to lead to discussions 
about all difference, including differences in sexuality. lrigaray's complex 
understanding of sexual difference as natural, cultural, spiritual, and mor-
phological can help us interpret transsexual narratives, narratives by people 
who seek medical intervention to attain the correct embodiment (Feinberg 
l996; Prosser 1998). Transsexual and transgender narratives can also help 
us to better .understand Irigaray's insistence that corporeality is indispensable 
for cultivating sexual difference. However, accounts of transgender experi-
ence- people whose gender identity does not correspond to their sex and 
assigned g nder identity (Feinberg 1996; Halberstam 2005 )- challenge any 
conception that sexual difference can be only binary. 
. In the first part of this chapter, I focus on lrigaray's notion of sexual 
di~erence and critiques from feminist philosophers who argue that lrigaray 
relies on essentialism to define sexual difference. Many scholars assume that 
111 
D 
112 DAN IELLE POE 
because lrigaray's philosophy begins with a critique of masculine discourse 
in order to create a space for the feminine that she makes her distinction 
between the masculine and the feminine based on biological differences. 
These readings of lrigaray portray her as conservative and sympathetic to 
traditional gender stereotypes, which betrays Irigaray's continuous critique of 
static understandings of sex and gender (Irigaray 1996 [1 992], 2001 [1997], 
2002 [1 999)). A close read ing of !rig ray's texts revea ls that it is _a misun-
derstanding to think of sexual difference as simply biological or as static 
cultural essentialism. 
In the second section f this chapter, I discus the ways in which 
misreadings of sexual difference give rise to the argument that lrigaray's 
philosophy is normatively heterosexual (Butler and Cornell 1998; Murphy 
2007; Bergoffen 2007). The charge that Irigaray prescribes heterosexuali ty 
leads to the further charge that her philosophy is dismissive of transsexual 
and transgender people. In particular, I focus on the work of Ann Murphy, 
a recent critic of lrigaray's project. Murphy argues that lrigaray's notion 
of sexual difference forces women and men to identify with their gender 
and with conservative social norms, which harms those individuals whose 
sexuality challenges traditional norms. 
I argue that Murphy's critique of lrigaray hinges on misreadings of 
the relation between "nature" and "the natural," a distinction that lrigaray 
maintains in her work. According to Murphy, "nature" and "the natural" are 
one and the same for lrigaray, and woman's nature is that which spontane-
ously arises for women (Murphy 2007, 80-84). However, lrigaray develops 
her notion of "woman's nature" as a "cultivated natural" (lrigaray 2002 
[1999]). The "cultivated natural" is the way in which woman develops her 
nature both in relation to culture and her materi al circum ·ranees, in luding 
biology, psychology, and morphology. Thus, Irigaray doe.s not advocate that 
women should simply embrace the "nature" imposed on them by society 
or biology. She promotes a position in which woman creates her nature in 
keeping with the many parts that cause her to call herself "woman." 
Finally, I use lrigaray's notion of sexual difference to show that whereas 
critics are right to point out that lrigaray does not adequately develop what 
sexual difference means for transsexual and transgender people, her reader ' 
can use lrigaray's work to engage transsexual and transgender narratives. 
lrigaray's emphas is on the heterosexual relationship points to the deep dif-
ficulty of those relationships. Nonheterosexual relationships already chal-
lenge patriarchal structures in a way that helps to distinguish and support 
the limits of sexual difference. lrigaray's development of sexual difference is 
not a proj ect that intends merely to preserve sexual difference, but moves 
from systems of oppress ion to ethical ways of interacting. To show how 
lrigaray's philosophy is applicable to transsexual people, I examine the nar-
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ratives of gender crossing from Deirdre McCloskey and Max Wolf Valerio 
(McCloskey 1999; Treut et al. 1992). I then discuss the limits of lrigaray's 
analysis by considering descriptions of transgender experience as related by 
Judith Halberstam and Leslie Feinberg (Halberstam 2005; Feinberg 1996). 
TH E ES ENTIA LI M / ANTl - ES E.NT IALLSM D EBAT E 
In the 1980s many feminists critiqued lrigaray's project of articulating sexual 
difference because they were concerned that sexual difference could only 
be established by seeking out an essential feature that was common to all 
women and excluded all nonwomen. This feature wa thought t be an 
unchanging biological essence that would enforce a single lifesty le on all 
women. These feminists instead wanted to free women from burdensome 
stereotypes by arguing that there are no essential differences between men 
and women; we are all simply human. Irigaray and others argued that estab-
lishing a fundamental difference between men and women does not require 
discovering an essential feat~re common to all women. Instead, it requires 
a complex articulation of difference that is always present and the ground 
for other kinds of difference. 
The debate over lrigaray's supposed essentialism continues. I believe 
that what is commonly understood as a biological essentialism in lrigaray's 
work is a misreading, and lrigaray is not an essentialist. What is at stake 
in the debate about essentialism is whether feminists should work to erase 
sexual difference or work to establish sexual difference. Those who critique 
lrigaray's alleged essentialism argue that gender is socially imposed and can 
be overcome in favor of common humanity in which many differences can 
flourish (Butler and ornell 1998; Butler 1990, 1993). Those who advocate 
establishing sexual difference argue that the attempt t overcome it results 
in men dominating women (Irigaray 1985 [1 974], 1993 [1984], 1996 [1992], 
2002 (1999]). Defenders of Irigaray maintain that she observes factual dif-
ference based in culture and history and not the effects of a biological 
reductionism. 
The charge that lrigaray is an essentialist originates in her insistence 
that sexual difference is unavoidable, contributes to full human flourishing, 
and has the potential to transform re lationships between men and women, 
which in turn could transform the law, the market, and the environment. 
The argument that lrigaray relies on biological essentialism for her notion 
of sexual difference seems to come from her analysis of women's bodies. To 
understand why she focuses so heavily on women's bodies, it is important 
to remember that lrigaray's ethical, philosophical, and political roots all 
begin in an understanding of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis brings with it 
an attention to the body that pervades lrigaray's work. 
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As early as Speculum of the Other Woman, lrigaray turns her attention 
to an analysis of women's bodies (1985 [1974]). In "Irigaray's Body Sym-
bolic," Margaret Whitford draws our attention to the importance of the lips 
and mucous as a metaphor in lrigaray's work that can provide a model 0£ 
divinity, sexuali ty, and speech that are proper to establishing sexual differ-
ence. For Whitford, lrigaray's focus on lips and mucous provides a means of 
thinking about ethics as relational instead of hierarchical. In this model for 
ethics, the sensible is emphasized such that ethics relates to the here and 
now rather than to a static, universal definition. As something that is more 
accessible to touch than sight, mucous can only be accessed in the sensible. 
Mucous is at the threshold of the lips and signifies an openness, a refusal to 
close women into some fixed definition defined by patriarchy. Whitford also 
argues that mucous corresponds to women's sexuality and women's speech. 
Mucous can never be reduced to a part, or an object; therefore, mucous is 
not easily incorporated in the masculine imaginary. Mucous is not part of" 
a binary opposition; it touches and flows between that which it touches 
(Whitford 1991). 
If we take Whitford's analysis further, we notice that Irigaray's discus-
sion of mucous and its importance never occurs separately from her discus-
sion of the importance of the lips: 
A remaking of immanence and transcendence, notably through this 
threshol.d which has never been examined as such: the fema le sex. The 
threshold that gives access to the mucous. Beyond classical oppositions 
of love and hate, liquid and ice-a threshold that is always half-open. 
The threshold of the lips, which are strangers to dichotomy and op-
positions. Gathered one against the other but without any possible 
suture, at least of a real kind. They do not absorb the world into 
or through themselves, provided they are not misused and reduced 
to a means of consumption or consummation. They offer a shape 
of welcome but do not assimilate, reduce, or swallow up. (Irigaray 
1993 [1984], 18, emphasis in original) 
lrigara')' analyst- focu e cm b th the fa ia\ h\Y and th g t\ita\ hp . Tb. 
reh .tion of h p to them elve i one in which the touching-touched telati.on_ 
cannot be distinguished. The lips are both touched and touching. 
While some might argue that lrigaray's attention to women's lips is 
feature of essentialism in which a woman is a woman based on her genita-
lia, we can instead understand her focus on the lips as a rejoinder to Freud 
and Lacan's insistence that woman is an absence, absence of the penis and 
absence of the phallus. The lips are material and different than the penis. 
Yet, the lips are not a static category; the lips function differently in differ-
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ent circumstances. lrigaray emphasizes that lips both welcome and limit our 
relationships. For Irigaray, ethics is not simply about what one is permitted to 
do, but also how one is limited by the other (Irigaray 2001 [1997], 33-37). 
In welcoming and limiting the other, the ethical model demands first of all 
that a woman can speak for herself. For Irigaray, a woman speaks for herself 
by virtue of situating herself in relation to her sex and to the limit of her 
sex. She says, in fact, I am created by two genders and I live in a mixed 
community. But let us consider a utopia of our age: a woman gives birth 
to a woman, and they live in a community of women separated from the 
other part of the world. A woman in such a situation should consider her 
identity as woman as an identity in relationship with the other gender, at 
least insofar as it is her intention to fulfill her own gender. There is in me, 
woman, a part that is negative, not realizable by me alone, a part of night, 
a part that is reserved, a part that is irreducibly feminine and that is not 
suited to represent the whole of the human being that must enter into the 
constitution of my identity (34). 
Even for the woman who is born to another woman and who lives 
only with other women, this woman-among-women is still characterized by 
the part of her that cannot represent all of humanity. Thus, this woman 
does not become woman by "not being a man" since she has never been 
exposed to men. Rather, she becomes woman by recognizing her own irre-
ducibility and her own inability to represent every human. In this case, 
irreducibility has to do with her irreducibility as a single individual, who 
does not represent all women and is not represented by all women. Thus, 
lrigaray's claims about irreducibility include a means to preserve individuals' 
concreteness in relation to the universal. But, to fulfill her relationship to 
the universal, woman must consider her identity in relation to the identity 
of men. Her relation to the universal does not appropriate all universality. 
Woman's relationship to the universal through her gender does include 
attention to anatomical difference, but sexual difference includes much 
more than bodily difference. The previous passage emphasizes that although 
women's bodies are important for lrigaray, sexual difference is also based on 
relationships between people. Moreover, these relationships shape sexual dif-
ference, as well as being shaped by it. If lrigaray's work advocated biological 
essentialism, we would expect a static, universal notion of sex, which would 
shape relationships. However, lrigaray does not offer any essential character-
istics of women and men. Instead, she emphasizes the necessity of cultivating 
sexual difference in a way that would allow other differences to flourish. 
Hilge Landweer argues that the concepts of sex and gender are nec-
essarily bound to generativ ity, and all subsequent concepts derive from an 
original duality, the two sexes required for generation (Landweer 2005, 
29- 30). She writes, 
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I claim that reproduction is indeed a topic that has to be negoti-
ated on a social- theoretical level and that should not be turned 
into a taboo on grounds of a general suspicion of essentialism. 
Due to the anthropologically sti ll va lid fact that humans are born 
and die, generativity leads in every cu lture to categ rizations of 
"gender." By generativity I mean the simple insight that human 
societies (similar to many animals) depend for their reproduction 
on two sexes, no matter to what extent and with which culturally 
specific meaning. (31) 
The claim that sexual difference is always based on generat1v1ty and two 
sexes is a claim about the nature of being human. Every human society 
must concern itself with reproduction in order to continue. Accordingly, 
every society applies its own rules, performances, and structure to how thi 
generativity rakes place. For Landweer, essentialism is not a claim about 
women's and men's biological destiny; rather, it is the common starting 
point from which we can discuss and critique categories of sex and gender. 
I would add that sexual difference as related to generativity begins with 
each person's biological origin, but once conception has occurred, a person' 
experience of sex and gender will occur in any number of situations. One 
may be born to a single woman, raised by two men, may discover that one 
is transsexual or transgender. Even when people's concrete circumstance 
are not circumscribed by a heterosexual relationship, generativity inform 
how our culture is structured, and sexua l difference remains foundational 
and unavoidable. 
CULTfVATfNG THE NATURAL 
This section considers Ann Murphy's arguments that certa in passages in 
lrigaray's writings reveal a dangerous trend to stifle difference. Murphy points 
to passages in which lrigaray wants to limit sexual difference to inborn 
differences that ought not to be questioned or changed. I argue that Mur-
phy does indeed identify problematic passages in lrigaray's work, but we 
should use Irigaray's rejection of biological essentialism to counter lrigaray's 
rejection of transsexual and transgender identification. Drawing on work 
by Landweer and Alison Stone, I argue that natural differences-inborn 
differences-should be cultivated to preserve se~ua l difference. Contrary 
to Irigaray's own interpretation of sexual difference, I read the cultivation 
of sexual difference as inclusive of transsexual and transgender experience. 
In the article "Beyond Performativity and Against 'Identification': 
Gender and Technology in Irigaray," Murphy continues the essentialism 
critique of Irigaray's conception of sexual difference by arguing that "[Iri-
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garay's] understanding of nature, and her attendant hesitations regarding 
technology, lead in her later work to the forthright dismissal of discourses 
on androgeny, the neuter, performativity and gender identification" (Murphy 
2007, 77). As Murphy develops this claim, it seems that she interprets lri-
garay's use of the term "nature" as a natural, essential category that women 
have as distinct from men. For instance, Murphy cites the following passage 
from I Love to You: 
Without doubt, the most appropriate context for the universal is 
sexual difference. Indeed, this content is both real and universal. 
Sexual difference is an immediate natural given and it is a real and 
irreducible component of the universal. The whole of human kind 
is composed of women and men and of nothing else. The problem 
of race is, in fact, a secondary problem . . . and the same goes for 
other cultural diversities-religious, economic, and political ones. 
(Irigaray 1996 [1992], 47; Murphy 2007, 80). 
The question that arises from this passage is how to understand what lri-
garay means by "an immediate natural given." The key to understanding 
this passage is lrigaray's emphasis on the irreducibility of sexual difference. 
Hence, sexual difference is natural inasmuch as it is perpetually present. 
The natural is not some biologically determined quality or qualities. Sexual 
difference does not manifest itself in the same way in every circumstance. 
Landweer's analysis of gender as a holistic concept helps to clarify my 
argument that sexual difference is not a biological essentialism. As I will 
continue to argue, sexual difference is something that is perpetually present, 
but its manifestations change and evolve. Landweer states, 
I would like to make the previously mentioned "holistic" argument 
based on the claim that the term gender refers to and is oriented 
toward a time axis. Gender is empirically always connected with 
memory, temporality and history, even though this involves infinite 
variations and an unforeseeable scope of new meanings. None of 
the mentioned concepts can be fully removed from this entire se-
mantic field without changing the meaning of the other concepts. 
(Landweer 2005, 34) 
Gender and sexual difference always make reference to a host of other cu l-
tural and historical terms and understandings. The interpretation and the 
practice of gender and sexual difference vary widely in different times and in 
different societies, yet sexual difference is always present. Sexual difference is 
universal inasmuch as it is always present, regardless of other homogenizing 
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influences. Racial, religious, economic, and political differences are impor-
tant for understanding and cultivating difference, but we can imagine and 
create circumstances in which those differences are absent. Thus, sexual 
difference as universal refers to the inescapable nature of sexual difference, 
which manifests itself both in generativity and other cultural relationships. 
For Murphy, though , lrigaray's conception of exual difference is also 
problematic because of lrigaray's suspicion of strategic of ident ificati n. 
Indeed, Murphy cites a passage from I Love to You that seems to provid 
evidence that sexual difference reduces people to gross stereotypes and gen-
der essentialism: 
Some of our prosperous and nai"ve contemporaries, women and men, 
would like to wipe out [sexual] difference by resorting to mon o-
scxuality, to the unisex, and to what is ca lled identification: ev n 
if I am bodily a man or a woman, I can identify with, and so be, 
the other sex. This new opium of the people annihilates the other 
in the illusion of a reduction to identity, equality, and sameness, 
especially between man and woman, the ult imate anchorage of real 
alterity. (lrigaray 1996 [1992), 61- 62; Murphy 2007, 89) 
In I art, this passage simply reinfo rces lrigaray's insistence that a mono exual 
culture destroys all difference. Throughout her work, lrigaray has rejected 
strategies in which sexual difference is era ed since this erasure does n t 
result in some higher, more human way of being, but in woman being 
appropriated by man. lrigaray's concept of sexual difference emphasizes that 
the constructs and choices we practice are inscribed on the physical bodies 
of actual women and men. Landweer reminds us of the holistic nature of 
sexual difference when she argues that ridding society of binary sexual dif-
ference means that we must rid society of all dual-sex reproductive practices; 
otherwise, society maintains its connection to generativity as dependent on 
binary sexual difference (Landweer 2005, 40) . The difficulty with alternative 
reproductive practices (aside from the current scientific impossibility) is the 
coercion and undermining of freedom and determination that it entails in 
order to force people to abandon all of our current reproductive practices 
(Landweer 2005 , 40) . Further, it is difficult to imagine, and as yet unde-
fined by advocates, how new reproductive practices would lead to more ju t 
relationships in the world . 
Even if we accept the notion of sexual difference as inevitable, it is 
difficult to defend lrigaray against the charge that she rejects identification 
between the sexes, which might include a woman becoming a man or a 
man becoming a woman. This passage is an example in which we can read 
lrigaray against herself because unless bodily difference is what decides sexual 
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difference- which lrigaray rejects throughout her work- there is no reason 
why someone who is bodily a man or a woman could not identify with the 
other sex. A man or woman whose body disagrees with his or her sexual 
identification does not threaten sexual difference, lead to monosexuality, 
or to the unisex. lrigaray's insistence that "identity, equality, and sameness" 
are a problem does not lead to the further conclusion that people who are 
transsexual and transgencler would collapse the distinction between women 
and men. 
Transsexual discourse that understands sexual difference as a dualism 
can be understood in the context of lrigaray's conception of the natural, 
which she develops in Between East and West. I characterize the notion of 
sexual difference that she develops in this text as a "cultivated natural." 
That is, she emphasizes the ties that our bodies always and already have to 
nature and the natural world, but she also emphasizes that those ties must 
be refined and cultivated. The cultivation that she wants for the body can 
be derived from her critique of "sociological culture": 
[The body) is submitted to sociological rules, to rhythms foreign 
to its sensibility, to its living perceptions: day and night, seasons, 
vegetal growth . ... This means that acts of participation in light, 
sounds or music, odors, touch or even in natural tastes are no lon-
ger cultivated as human qualities. The body is no longer educated 
to develop its perceptions spiritually, but to detach itself from the 
sensible for a more abstract, more speculative, more sociological 
culture. (lrigaray 2002 [1999), 55-56) 
Notice in this passage that lrigaray does not insist that the body must 
remain as one finds it. Instead, she critiques a culture in which one turns 
away from the body, and she calls for a culture in which the body's sensibili-
ties are cultivated and developed. Thus, a woman's or a man's body must 
be developed in keeping with her or his sex and doing so means paying 
attention to nature's rhythms, more so than culture's demands. According 
to Stone, lrigaray connects sexual difference to nature to emphasize the 
continuous cycling between poles of difference and humans' place in this 
natural cycle. Nature functions in such a way that distinct processes function 
interdependently. Stone gives respiration as an example: inhalation depends 
on exhalation, although, they are distinct processes. Men and women are 
the complete realization of this duality because they cultivate their duality 
through culture (Stone 2003, 63-65). 
Ultimately, the sexual difference is about cultivating the negative and 
the positive, difference and relationship. lrigaray devotes much space in her 
work to developing her understanding of the negative, which has an integral 
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place in articulating sexual difference. On the one hand, she differentiates 
her understanding of the negative from its traditional place in philosophy. 
In the prologue of I Love to You, she states, 
What I knew of the negative was the practice and the effects of 
moderation, measuredness, renunciation, a certain cultivation of 
personal sensibility, but it lacked any real return either in myself 
or for myself. As for an absolute in-itself or for-itse lf, I could see 
their limitations only too well to believe in them and desire them. 
(Irigaray 1996 [1992], 13) 
In this description, Irigaray stresses the role between the negative and the 
positive, or the irreducible difference and the relationship. A negative thar 
simply limits one's actions cannot provide a ground for new relationships 
between persons. When the negative is defined as irreducible difference, it 
makes way for relationships between people. Traditionally, the negative has 
been used to say that woman is not man, which deprives woman of any 
position. The negative in its traditional sense is not itself merely historical. 
That the negative gets ascribed to women is historical; the negative gets 
ascribed to women by men. When this kind of negativity is ascribed to 
women, negativity is controllable, locatable. 
For Irigaray, the negative is the limit that applies to every person 
by virtue of sexual difference. That is, one's experience can never be uni-
versalized because it is always limited by reference to a single gender. By 
limiting one's knowledge in a way that can never be overcome, Irigaray 
finds a ground for new relationships between men and women. Irigaray 
stresses the role between the negative and the positive, or the irreducible 
difference and the relationship. A negative that simply limits one's actions 
cannot provide a ground for new relationships between persons. When the 
negative is defined as irreducible difference, it makes way for relationship 
between people ( 13 ). Irigaray writes the following about her transformed 
understanding of the negative: 
The meeting at San Donato led me to discover that the negative can 
mean access to the other of sexual difference and thereby become 
happiness without being annihilating in the process. Hegel knew 
nothing of a negative like that. His negative is still the mastery of 
consciousness (historically male) over nature and humankind. The 
negative in sexual difference means an acceptance of the limits of 
my gender and recognition of the irreducibility of the other. It can-
not be overcome, but it gives a positive access-neither instinctual 
nor drive-related-to the other. (13) 
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lrigaray rejects the negative in Hegel's texts because it is a "mastery of 
consciousness." This rejection, however, does not eliminate the negative's 
place in a dialectic of sexual difference. Sexual difference transforms the 
role of the negative by recognizing its place in our relationships with the 
other. The negative makes room for the irreducibility of the other. Even 
as we come together in positive work for alleviating suffering, exploitation, 
and violence, the negative guarantees my recognition that the other is more 
than I can ever encounter or conceive. 
The role of the negative also functions between women-among-them-
selves and men-among-themselves by guaranteeing their singular identity. 
Woman and man must relate not only to each other, but to others like them. 
By relating to others like them, woman comes to understand her concrete 
singularity, which is irreplaceable by any other woman. 
Thus, the first part of Irigaray's philosophical project begins with an 
emphasis on finding the inconsistencies, gaps, and irrationality of philosophy 
that focuses on a singular vision of what it means to be human. In particular, 
she focuses on the ways in which a "feminine" consciousness is hidden by 
a masculine process. In the later part of her philosophical project, Irigaray 
describes the ways in which men and women might find ways of having 
relationships that respect irreducible difference. Irigaray's work points to the 
need to take seriously the concerns expressed by essentialist feminists and 
antiessentialist feminists, but also we must move beyond these reductive 
categories to move to the real work of transformation. 
IRIGARAY AND TRANS PEOPLE 
As I have argued throughout this chapter, Irigaray's notion of sexual differ-
ence does not rely on any static conception of femininity or masculinity. 
Instead, sexual difference is a dynamic process in which men and women 
cultivate their identities as men and women. Moreover, I have used Irigaray's 
theoretical articulation of sexual difference to illustrate that although she 
is quite critical of feminist strategies that insists that genders are the same, 
equal, or interchangeable, she does not draw the further conclusion that no 
one is transsexual or transgender. 
Many authors have used Irigaray's work to critique normative hetero-
sexuality (Hope 1994; Schutte 1997; Ferguson 2004). Ofelia Schutte argues 
that Irigaray's disruption of symbolic structures moves society incrementally 
away from normative heterosexuality by emphasizing the phenomenology 
of touching and parting (Schutte 1997, 53). Schutte's argument empha-
sizes the power of touching to disrupt the symbolic power of penetration. 
Also, Schutte's emphasis on parting should remind us of the distance that 
the negative creates; both parting and distance create space for women 
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to develop apart from heterosexual relationships. Ann Ferguson applauds 
Schutte's critique of Irigaray and furthers that critique by citing numerous 
authors whom Schutte fails to mention in her critique of lrigaray (Ferguson 
2004, 173- 74 ). Trevor Hope, on the other hand, argues th.at Irigaray offers 
a compelling critique of normative heterosexuality but is not adequately 
attentive to the regulatory strength of homophobia (Hope 1994, 174-75). 
Irigaray's work can move us even further than providing a critique of 
normative heterosexuality. Her theory can be used to provide a theoreti-
cal groundwork for interpreting the narratives of transsexual people who 
describe their experience of crossing genders as visibly becoming the people 
that they always knew themselves to be. In Transgender Warriors, Leslie 
Feinberg defines transsexual people as those who "traverse the boundary 
of the sex they were assigned at birth" (Feinberg 1996, x). For the trans-
sexual man or woman, surgical intervention allows him or her to cross a 
sexual boundary and to embody the proper sex (Prosser 1998, 69, 83). If we 
consider some of the literature on crossing from male to female or female 
to male, Irigaray's point, that sexual difference is an irreducible difference, 
clarifies why crossing sex boundaries is important for transsexuals. 
Consider the book Crossing: A Memoir, by Deirdre N. McCloskey, 
in which the author details her transition from being a man to being a 
woman. McCloskey states, "My gender crossing was motivated by identity, 
not by a balance sheet of utility" (McCloskey 1999, xiii). McCloskey did not 
become a woman simply because she thought that women are happier, nicer, 
or prettier, nor did she cross because she thought that women have easier 
lives. Rather, she argues that she changed her physical identity to match 
her psychological and spiritual identity. In McCloskey's case, it would seem 
that the body with which she was born was an unreliable way of establish-
ing sexual difference. For McCloskey, her sexual identity is established by 
her mind, emotions, and spiritual beliefs. Only after she fully crossed did 
her body become consonant with her identity. 
For lrigaray, the body is working with the mind, emotions, and spiri-
tual beliefs to define sexual identity and to establish sexual difference, but 
McCloskey's experience challenges us to refine our understanding of sex-
ual identity and difference. In this case, sexual identity is still established 
through sexual difference because McCloskey knew he was not like other 
men. Through crossing, McCloskey discovered herself as like other women, 
a discovery that brings consonance between her mind and body, but requires 
more conscious cultivation than is required of women born with female 
bodies. 
Now, consider the story of Max Wolf Valerio, a female-to-male trans-
sexual (Treut et al. 1993). He tells a similar story to the one told by Deirdre 
McCloskey in that his gender crossing is motivated by identity: "I always felt 
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like I was supposed to be a boy. Like I was a boy. Even though, I knew I 
was not, but I felt I was somehow" (Treut et a l. 1993, 98-99). He describes 
being male as his iden tity: "My male gender identity was sort of the core 
of my personality, of the core ingredients of who I am" (Treut et al. 1993 , 
98-99). Similar to McCloskey's insistence that sex crossing is not something 
that people choose to do fo r utility or for gaining acceptance or financial 
gain, Max describes trying to be a woman and to live as a lesbian. Ulti-
mately, this attempt fai led. "Then one day it just happened. It was like an 
explosion in my mind. When I realized that I wasn't really a lesbian, I was 
a transsexual, and I was really a straight man" (Treut et al. 1993 , 98-99). 
For Valerio, his life as a transsexual entails being treated as a man by others 
and not simply knowing in his own mind that he is a man. 
As McCloskey says, "Gender is not in every way natural" (McCloskey 
1999, xv ). Gender is established by eras, societies, and individuals and .is 
projected on bodies. In the cases of McCloskey and Valerio, though, simply 
changing their own conceptions of what it means to be a man or a woman 
did not satisfy the separation they felt between themselves and how other 
men and women viewed them. Thus, it would seem that although one's body 
is not enough to establish one's identity as male or female, it contributes 
in significant ways, such that for some people who experience dissonance 
between their sexual identity and their biological identity, it is rational to 
cross from male to female or female to male. 
The distinction between sexual identity and biological identity is a 
familiar theme in l rigaray's work, as she distinguishes between anatomy and 
morphology. As Whitford reminds us, morphology is the way in which bod-
ies are culturally mediated (Whitfo rd 1991, 107). That is, we begin with 
some anatomical structures, but the interpretation of our anatomy is fi ltered 
through culture. In the case of transsexuals, it is important for her or his 
body to be recogn ized differently from the anatomy with which she or he is 
born. The descript ions that McCloskey and Valerio offer about gender cross-
ing indicate that there is something important about one's gender identity 
that confirms the arguments that I have been making. Sexual difference is a 
process of cultivating nature. lrigaray's descriptions of cult ivating the natural 
require one to cultivate the body with which one is born. However, trans-
sexual accounts of cult ivating identity require changing their bodies, or the 
way that others view their bodies, in order for others to recognize who they 
are. For McCloskey and Valerio, crossing from male to female and female to 
male allows them to have bodies that correspond to their self-understanding. 
A lthough lrigaray herself would not cite these cases as instances of cultivat-
ing the natural, I believe that they are because McCloskey and Valerio do 
not claim to be inventing their sexual identities; they are establishing sexual 
identities that are already latently present. 
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Jay Prosser's account of transsexuality in Second Skins highlights the 
importance of establishing a correlation between one's embodiment as rec-
ognized by others and one's own body image. According to Prosser, prior to 
sexual reassignment surgery, transsexuals feel that they arc trapped in the 
wrong body (Pros~cr l 998, 69). Sexual reassignment allows a transsexual 
person 1'to get the body back to what should have been" ( 83). 
Whereas gender is not something that can be solely determined by 
culture, body, or biology, all of these things come together to help one 
identify with and distinguish oneself from others of the same gender and 
another gender. For a transsexual person, this process of identification and 
distinction can be aided by sex reassignment. Rather than restricting sexual 
difference to women born women and men born men, sexual difference is a 
concept that allows a flourishing of different experiences. As Stone states, 
"a culture of ubiquitous and maximal sexual difference wou ld not restrict 
individuality or autonomy, but show unprecedented permissiveness in the 
ex tent to which it allowed and solicited individuals to realize themselves in 
accordance with their natural drives" (Stone 2003, 73 ). lrigaray's readers, 
Stone among them, emphasize the flourishing of difference that comes out 
of the concept of sexual difference, a flourishing that can include transsexual 
and transgender difference. 
The difficulties that transsexuals face in defining their gender status are 
the traces of the sex to which they were born. We can imagine a transsexual 
person who has crossed to the other gender; she or he is indistinguishable 
in her or his hormones, anatomy, vo ice, mannerisms, and self- understanding 
from other women or men. However, the transsexual always has a past that 
is not like other men and women. The transsexua l was born as the other 
sex, can remember having the other sex's genitalia and hormones, and car-
ries the memories of being treated as the other sex (Stone 1994, 5-10) . 
Nevertheless, transsexual narratives underscore the importance of under-
standing sexual difference as between two. The transsexual person has not 
been fooled by a cultural binary. If she or he were that easily swayed, then 
she or he could simply accept the label that society assigns. A transman, 
as Matt Kailey refers to himself, is not a woman who is tricking people 
into thinking that she is a man; he is a man (Kailey 2005, 28). lrigaray's 
articulation of sexual difference can help us to respect transsexuals and their 
relationship to nature and culture. 
If theorists of sexual difference insist that sexual difference is a strict 
binary, then they cannot open a conversation with transgender people 
whose experience does not fit into the binary between man and woman. 
Whereas transsexual people are men or women (not both), transgender 
people are men and women. According to Feinberg, "Transgender people 
traverse, bridge, or blur the boundary of the gender expression they were 
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assigned at birth" (Feinberg 1996, x, emphasis in original) . The way in 
which transgender people traverse, bridge, or blur gender boundaries has 
many manifestations. O ne might be born a female and appear masculine or 
androgynous, or born a male and appear ~ minin or androgyn us. We can 
consider two manifestations of transgender people by drawing on personal 
descriptions from C. Jacob Hale and Leslie Feinberg. 
For Hale, being transgender is what he chooses. Hale describes a time 
in his life when as a w man, she engaged in a culture in which she could 
become an adolescent boy (Hale 1997 ). The culture he describes allows for 
a masculine identity that he argues is more real than sexual fa ntasy or mere 
identification with the othe r sex, but less permanent than the complete 
transformation of a fe male-to-male transsexual person. 
According to Feinberg, being transgender is what happens in a society 
with rigid sex/gender boundaries. Fe inberg attempts to define herself to a 
reporter and says, "l am transgendered. I was born female, but my masculine 
gender expression is seen as male. It's not my sex that defines me, and it's 
not my gender expression. It's the fact that my gender expression appears 
to be at odds with my sex. Do you understand? It's the social contradiction 
between the two that defines me" (Feinberg 1996, 101) . In response, the 
reporter asked Feinberg if she's a third sex, which only deepened Feinberg's 
frustration. T hroughout the book Transgencler Warriors, Feinberg presents 
historical ev idence of societies in which people who crossed gender lines 
were accepted and celebrated, or vilified and persecuted. She creates a space 
for the reader to understand that transgender people have always existed. 
Feinberg's project creates a space for transgender people to locate their expe-
rience as like others' experience and creates a challenge to the idea that 
sexual diffe rence can be underst od as a rigid binary. Hale and Feinberg 
give evidence that sexual diffe rence can be fluid, can change, and is defined 
within a cultural context. 
To understand the significance of cultural context for transgendered 
sexual difference, Judith Halberstam's statement about relationality can help , 
Transgender proves to be an important term not to people who want 
to res ide outside of categories altogether but to people who want 
to place themselves in the way of particular forms of recognition . 
Transgender may indeed be considered a term of relationality; it 
describes not simply an identity but a relation between people, within 
a community, or within int imate bonds. (Halberstam 2005, 49) 
"Transgender" is a term that helps place people in relation to people like 
them and distinct from them, a project which is intimately linked to Iriga-
ray's project of cultivating sexual difference. For lrigaray, cultivating sexual 
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difference requires a positive space in which people with shared culture, 
morphology, and genealogy can define and develop their experiences, but 
sexual difference also requires a negative space where the one's identity 
limits and is limited by the other's identity. 
lrigaray's philosophy has been groundbreaking in challenging the idea 
that sexual difference is rigid since being a woman r a man is defined by 
nature, culture, bi logy, and psychology. She leads the way in trying to 
think of sexual difference as at least two instead of as man and not-man. 
Yet, her own work overemphasizes that sexual difference is merely two and 
that the possibilities for cultivating one's sexual difference are inscribed at 
birth. Consider "How Old Are You?" from]e, Tu, Nous, in which she writes, 
The idea that I was born a woman but I must become the spirit 
or soul of this body I am. I must open out my female body, give it 
forms, words, knowledge of itself, a cosmic and social equilibrium, 
in relation to the environment, to the different means of exchange 
with others, and not only by artificial means that are inappropriate 
to it. (Irigaray 1993 [1990], 116) 
For lrigaray, the body with which one is born is definitive for developing 
what one should become. I have argued, though, that when the body, mind, 
and spirit tell different stories of who one is, then one's body can be cul-
tivated to correspond to the mind and spirit. Transsexual and transgender 
narratives reveal that the experience of sexual difference may change over 
the course of a life or may include identification with man and woman, 
masculine and feminine. These experiences provide a richness and complex-
ity for sexual difference that an insistence on a binary difference established 
at birth misses. To support the flourishing of difference illustrated by trans-
sexual and transgender people, we can use the rich language, framework, 
and methodology that lrigaray provides to discuss sexual difference, even as 
we acknowledge that lrigaray resists this expansion of her work. 
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